@pcd/gpc-pcd
v0.4.0
Published
- For information about making POD objects in Zupass, see the [`@pcd/pod-pcd`](https://github.com/proofcarryingdata/zupass/tree/main/packages/pcd/pod-pcd) package.
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Readme
A PCD representating a ZK proof about one or more POD (Provable Object Data) objects using a GPC (General Purpose Circuit). For a full introduction, see the Developer Site.
POD is a format enabling any app to flexibly create cryptographic data and make zero-knowledge proofs about it. A POD could represent your ticket to an event, a secure message, a collectible badge, or an item in a role-playing game. Using PODs, developers can create ZK-enabled apps without the effort and risk of developing their own cryptography.
ZK proofs about PODs use General Purpose Circuits (GPC) which can prove many different things about a POD without revealing it all. GPCs use human-readable configuration and pre-compiled circuits so no knowledge of circuit programming is required.
See the GPCPCD
class for more details on the data of a GPC PCD.
Related Packages
For information about making POD objects in Zupass, see the
@pcd/pod-pcd
package.For information about making proofs about PODs, see the
@pcd/gpc
package.To find the binaries required to prove and verify, see the
@pcd/proto-pod-gpc-artifacts
package. Since these artifacts are large and numerous, you generally won't want to depend on this package directly.
Stability and Security
POD and GPC libraries are experimental and subject to change. We encourage devs to try them out and use them for apps, but maybe don’t rely on them for the most sensitive use cases yet.
GPC proofs are considered ephemeral (for now), primarily intended for transactional use cases. Saved proofs may not be verifiable with future versions of code. Library interfaces may also change. Any breaking changes will be reflected in the NPM versions using standard semantic versioning.
These libraries should not be considered secure enough for highly-sensitive use cases yet. The circuits are experimental and have not been audited. The proving/verification keys were generated in good faith by a single author, but are not the result of a distributed trusted setup ceremony.